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et al.: BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS
Editorial Comment
The Book Review section in this issue represents our initial
effort to revive a recently dormant feature of the Quarterly.
It is our purpose, in this revival, to make available to the
Bar and the law student critical analyses of selective publications in or concerning the field of law, and perhaps these reviews will assist the attorney or student to determine which,
among the current works, he desires as an addition to his
library.
Under the heading of Recent PublicationsReceived, we propose to list those materials received by the Quarterly and
which would not be suitable for full review treatment, either
because the subject is not within an area of particular interest
to the Bar of the State or the Law School students, or because
the publication has already received noteworthy attention in
review periodicals.
As contacts with publishers and potential reviewers are
established and expanded, the Review section will likewise
expand. Any suggestions, assistance or criticism from our
readers will be welcomed and appreciated.
CHARLES M. GIBSON
Assistant Editor
AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: Robert H. Jackson. By Eugene C. Gerhart. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Vferrill Company, Inc.,
1958. Pp. 545. $7.50.
This is the biography of Robert H. Jackson, who, trained
in the general legal practice of a "country lawyer," became
a leading lawyer for President Roosevelt's New Deal, a member of the United States Supreme Court, and a principal figure in two important controversies of his lifetime: the BlackJackson controversy and the Nurnberg war crimes trials.
The author, Eugene C. Gerhart, is a young lawyer in upstate
New York.
Justice Jackson was a successful lawyer in a small New
York city (Jamestown: population, 31,000, when Jackson
was admitted to the Bar), when, a rare Democrat in a predominantly Republican area but having attracted statewide
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party notice, he was appointed the General Counsel to the
Treasury Department in 1934. His clientele had included individuals, banks, insurance companies, utilities - plaintiffs
and defendants - and a few indigent criminal defendants;
but he was philosophically a "liberal" New Dealer. He was
never a politician, however, and he regarded the appointment
primarily as good experience for his expected resumption of
private practice.
One of his first duties while in Washington was to handle
the Government's case for income tax evasion and fraud
against Andrew Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury
under three Presidents and Ambassador to Great Britain.
This case aroused much public interest, as many thought
Roosevelt was trying to make an example of the wealthy former Republican office holder. Although laboriously attempting to justify the prosecution, Mr. Gerhart, in this reviewer's
opinion, falls short of success. Mr. Mellon, on advice of tax
counsel, had engaged in a series of business transactions designed to reduce his income taxes. These are described by the
author as "legalistically correct," but which "looked phoney"
to "ordinary people." The only device described in detail (a
charitable trust of paintings which were never delivered) was
upheld as valid by the Board of Tax Appeals. The charge of
fraud, prosecuted at Roosevelt's insistence contrary to Jackson's advice, was lost by the Government. Mr. Gerhart paraphrases with implied approval a dissenting member of the
Board who criticized Mellon for having planned his business
affairs with tax consequences in mind. Thus it seems to this
reviewer that Mr. Gerhart fails to adequately distinguish between tax evasion and bona fide tax avoidance. In this discussion, as in other places in the book, the author evinces an
uncritical bias in favor of Jackson which impairs the book's
value as an objective study.
Mr. Jackson rose in the Government's legal service becoming successively head of the Justice Department's Antitrust
Division, Solicitor General, and Attorney General. Primarily
a lawyer, Jackson probably enjoyed service as Solicitor General better than any other position, for in this he was primarily an advocate, removed to a considerable degree from
the intrigues of Washington politics. As a lawyer, he seems
to have been a man of outstanding ability as well as of the
highest integrity. He won most of the Supreme Court cases
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which he presented on behalf of the Government (October,
1938, Term record: won, 22 cases; lost, 2). Mr. Justice Brandeis said of him, "Jackson should be Solicitor General for
life."
Politically, he supported President Roosevelt's court-packing plan of 1937, and appeared before Congressional committees for this purpose. His arguments were, inter alia, that the
Constitution must be regarded only as a flexible general plan
of government which should not impede the legislative will
as expressed by Congress, that by strict construction the
Court as then constituted was limiting the federal government only to functions originally intended for it by the
framers of the Constitution, and that as a result the Court
was preventing the solution of problems faced by the American people. Although the judicial reorganization plan was not
adopted for a number of different reasons, Jackson's arguments were probably presented better than those of any other
Administration witness.
While Attorney General, Jackson furnished the opinion
which legally justified President Roosevelt's lend-lease aid
to Britain. His reasoning was perhaps first explained publicly in a speech read before the Inter-American Bar Association in Havana on March 27, 1941. Here, Jackson justified
aid to a belligerent - contrary to prevailing international
legal theories of the duties of a neutral nation - on the
grounds that the Axis nations were conducting an "unlawful"
war of aggression, contrary to the Kellogg-Briand pact for
the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy
and other international treaties to which the Axis partners
were parties. In thus discriminating between "just" and
"unjust" wars, Jackson claimed to find support in Grotius'
pioneering theories of international law, in the actions of
supposedly neutral states toward belligerents during the past
three centuries, and in the post-World War I revolution in
traditional attitudes towards belligerents and neutrals. These
views, ably and convincingly presented, were later used as a
basis for the trial of the German war criminals.
Jackson was appointed to the United States Supreme Court
on June 12, 1941. Although regarded as one of the more
"liberal" New Dealers prior to his appointment, he seemed
somewhat more conservative on the Bench, especially in comparison with his contemporaries, Justices Black and Douglas.
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His controversy with Justice Black over the latter's participation in two important labor cases argued by Justice Black's
former law partner and legal counsel seriously impaired the
Court's prestige and brought demands that both resign. Jackson's open criticism of Black's conduct was perhaps responsible for his not receiving the Chief Justiceship when Chief
Justice Stone died, a position virtually promised to Jackson
by Roosevelt at the time of his appointment to the Court.
In April, 1945, while on the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson was appointed chief United States prosecutor for the trial
of the Nazi war criminals. As part of this assignment, he
met with British, French, and Soviet representatives in the
summer of 1945 and helped negotiate a "charter" defining
the crimes for which the defeated Nazis would be prosecuted.
The whole concept of trial of the vanquished by the victors
aroused much debate. There had never been a satisfactor
definition of "aggression," since the victor always defined
the word to include only the vanquished. Most international
legal authorities thought that because of this, no war could
properly be called "illegal." But Jackson, expanding on the
views expressed earlier at Havana, argued that there was an
international common law which prohibited a war begun
for any purpose whatsoever. Thus the crime of plotting a
"war of aggression" was defined by the victorious powers so
as to eliminate all defenses. Other crimes defined by the conference, including the atrocities committed by the Nazis, were
less subject to the charge of being ex post facto. But the novelty of refusing the defenses of sovereign immunity and of
compulsion, as well as other circumstances, caused the other
indictments to be criticized as well.
Jackson conducted the American prosecution with much
ability, and the trials were probably a great deal fairer than

anybody expected. Despite the criticism, the outcome was generally regarded as just, and only the method was regarded
as questionable. Chief Justice Stone, who opposed all extrajudicial work for judges, referred to the trials as Jackson's
"high grade lynching party."
If the reader is unconvinced about the wisdom of the trials,
Mr. Gerhart's defense of them will not wholly convince him.
But Mr. Gerhart correctly points out that they presented the
defendants every opportunity before their conviction to explain their side for the benefit of history and were certainly
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better than executive disposition which many, including the
British at first, wanted.
There are few technical errors that this reviewer could find.
In addition to the earlier criticism of the author's bias in
favor of his subject (probably common to most biographies),
the principal defect is the too profuse use of quotations from
Justice Jackson's speeches. These make the book at times
dull, and their profusion detracts from the more important
excerpts. Most of the quotations could be more effectively
paraphrased. Apart from these criticisms, however, this
book is a fascinating and well-written study of Justice Jackson and the era to which he contributed so much.
The final picture of Jackson which emerges is that of a
highly capable legal thinker and advocate and a man of strong
integrity and independence. He was proud of being a "country
lawyer," and was representative of the best of them.
H. SIMMONS TATE, JR.*
THE LAW OF AWOL. By Alfred Avins. New York: Oceana
Publications. 1957. Pp. 288. $5.00.
Art. 86. Absent without leave.
Any member of the armed forces who, without proper authority(1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the
time prescribed; or
(2) goes from that place; or
(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit,
organization, or other place of duty at which
time he is required to be at the time prescribed:
shall be punished as a court martial may direct.1
The above statement of the current statute which is applicable to the offense commonly known as "AWOL", is the starting point for Mr. Avins' treatment of the law and its interpretation in regard to one who is or may be charged as being
absent without leave from military duty.
*A.B., cum laude, Harvard College, 1951; LL.B., Law School of Harvard University, 1956; Member, Richland County, South Carolina, and
American Bar Associations; Associated with firm of Boyd, Bruton &
Lumpkin, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 50 U. S. C. A. § 680.
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As noted in the opening pages of this work, the offense of
AWOL has been a constant problem and source of concern
to military commanders throughout the centuries and has
been dealt with as a violation of military law as long as there
have been bodies of organized armed forces. During World
War I, slightly under half of the offenses in the United States
Army were AWOLs. While during World War II an even
larger proportion of the offenses committed were AWOLs.
In light of the widespread incidence of the problem of
AWOL, it would seem well that the average practitioner have
some knowledge of the operation of the statutory law, as well
as the case decisions, which pertains to the offense. This need
takes on a practical importance for civilian practitioners
when considered in the light of these two factors: (1) In many
states today, South Carolina for example, military posts and
bases are so dispersed as to create areas of military personnel
in almost every section of the state. (2) Military personnel
are entitled to retain civilian legal representatives when
charged with the offense of AWOL as well as any other offense which would bring them before a military tribunal.
These factors, coupled with the high incidence of the offense
of AWOL, make it almost certain that the average practitioner will, at some time, have a need for a concise treatment
of this aspect of military law.
The author's mode of presentation of the subject is a curious blend of text and casebook treatment. The three major
parts of the book are sub-divided into chapters and sections
which follow the general scheme of presenting some historical
background, a text-type statement of the specific point under
consideration and finally, short briefs of cases which are in
point. The majority of the material consists of the case briefs.
In some instances the presented abstract of a case leaves the
reader with some doubt as to the operation of the rule of law
under discussion because of the absence or brevity of the
facts. Although sketchy, the range of these cited cases is
great, often dating back to Colonial days and the Court Martial records of Great Britain. Also included are numerous citations from Australia, Canada, and India.
As previously stated, the material has been presented in
three sections, the first section being the Introduction. The
second section is entitled "The Prosecution's Case" and the
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final section presents "The Defense's Case". The bulk of the
book is devoted to these two latter sections and in part effectively spotlights those topics with which one unfamiliar with
the law of AWOL would be most interested. An interesting
facet of this type of arrangement of material is that separate
sections, grouped under "The Prosecution'sCase", are devoted
to the various situations from which a charge of AWOL would
usually arise and the elements necessary to make valid such a
charge.
Part III sets forth the various defenses available, beginning
with impossibility and continuing through former punishment.
Here again, Mr. Avins has set out, in step by step order, those
elements necessary to sustain the various pleas plus case briefs
to illustrate the text statements. As in the preceding sections,
the author makes use of short definitive statements at the beginning of each subsection which serve to give the reader an
ample introduction to the contents of the subsection.
The preface states that the book is designed for multi-purpose use - to be of assistance to the student, the practicing
attorney, the military service school presenting a law course
and for the military attorney. While this ambitious forecast
may not be justifiable in every instance, the worth of the book
to the average civilian practitioner is readily apparent, both
as a ready reference and as a starting point for deeper research. Moreover, it should be invaluable as a handbook to the
active military practitioner.
WILBURN C. GABLE, JR.
Editor-in-Chief.
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